Wills and Trusts by Galvin, Charles O.
SMU Law Review
Volume 21




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





T IS interesting to observe the increase in litigation in these fields of the
law. Prior to World War II, the number of consultants engaged in es-
tate planning in Texas was relatively small. There were few large trust
departments even in the metropolitan areas. Indeed, it was not until 1943
that a statute relating to trusts was adopted.1 In the intervening period,
however, the rise in property values, the greater sophistication of property
owners about estate planning, and the vastly increased amount of literature
generally disseminated about effective family and business arrangements
have all impelled greater activity in this area. As the wills and trust in-
struments of the last twenty-five years continue to mature, we will see
more controversies boiling up through the lower courts and courts of civil
appeals to the Texas Supreme Court involving questions of construction,
powers of appointment, contingent and vested interests, breach of fiduciary
obligations, and so on. The cases in the year under review are portentous
of some of the more difficult issues yet to be litigated.
I. FORMALITIES OF EXECUTION
From the time of the Statute of Wills' the making of a will has been
deemed a privilege. In order to exercise this privilege the testator must ob-
serve the formalities of execution with an abundance of care. In no other
area of the law are the rituals enforced with greater strictness. Whether in
the small county seat la7 office, the large offices of an urban law firm, the
hospital ward, or tE. home, counsel is always advised to cause the execu-
tion of the will to proceed with the greatest solemnity and gravity. Under
current Texas practice, there are usually two distinct stages in the cere-
mony: first, the declaration by the testator that he is signing his will, his
actual signing before the witnesses, and the signing by the witnesses;a sec-
ond, the execution by the testator and witnesses of the self-proving affi-
davit.4 The first is necessary; the second is optional, relating as it does to
matters of proof only.
Boren v. Boren' deals with the interrelationship of the self-proving affi-
* B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University; S.J.D., Har-
vard University. Dean and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1 Texas Trust Act, TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b (1965).
21540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1.
aTEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (1965).
Ibid.
'402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 426; accord, McGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d
702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. (will held a nullity because signatures of both testator and
witnesses appeared only on self-proving provisions).
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davit with the will. The decedent signed a typewritten document which
purported to be his last will. The names of the witnesses were not sub-
scribed; however, attached to the will was a self-proving affidavit with the
signatures of the testator and the witnesses, and the notary's acknowledg-
ment. Although the affidavit recited that the witnesses did sign the docu-
ment purporting to be the last will, they had in fact not done so. Reversing
a decision of the court of civil appeals which had approved the document
as a will on the grounds that there was substantial compliance with the
formalities, the court held that a testamentary document, to be self-proved,
must first be a will. Since the document was not a will, the entire instru-
ment was a nullity.
Codicils must be executed with the same formalities attendant upon the
execution of the original will. In a civil: appeals case" the purported codicil
stated in part: "I have a will made out wholly to Floy. Thats [sic] all right
but I want the stock dividends, farm income, etc divided with Alva. .. "
The cc-art held that this merely expressed a wish or desire and did not give
anything to any specific person. Because of the precatory language and
the ambiguity created thereby, the instrument was not operative as a
codicil.'
When a valid will has been admitted into court, the proponent still has
the burden of showing that the will has not been revoked.' As in the case of
the execution of a will, revocation must be accomplished in one of the ways
provided in the statute. In a civil appeals case' the testator's daughter, in
opposition to the proponents of the will, submitted an affidavit that her
father had told her that he had willed property to a sixteen-year old girl.
The court held that this was not sufficient to defeat the proponent's -show-
ing of non-revocation.
II. PROCEDURE
Receivership. A trustee held a substantial block of stock in a corpora-
tion controlled by residuary beneficiaries of the trust. The residuary bene-
ficiaries alleged mismanagement and misconduct. Although receivership is
regarded as a harsh remedy, the court of civil appeals could not find that
the trial judge on all the facts had abused his discretion in appointing a re-
ceiver." Nor would an injunction in the circumstances have been less on-
erous."
Bill of Review. A decedent died intestate, and an administrator was
6 Fitzgerald v. Agnew. 402 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
7Accurd, Itinson v. Hison, 154 Tex. 561, 280 S.W.2d 731 (1955).SBrackcnridge v. Roberts. 114 Tex. 418, 270 S.W. 1001 (1925).
ollctts v. Betts, 395 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
10 Pfciffer v. Pfeiffer. 594 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error dismissed.
" 1i. at 681.
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appointed by the probate court. It was established that the court erred in
failing to require commissioners to partition real estate and in failing to ap-
point attorneys ad litem to represent unknown heirs. The appellant main-
tained that the orders were void, and hence that subsequent orders were
pertinent for the running of the statute of limitations. However, the orig-
inal orders were found to be merely voidable; thus the two-year period
within which a bill of review could be filed began with the date of such
orders. On this ground the civil appeals court" held that the filing of the
bill was not timely since more than two years had elapsed since the date of
such orders.
Allowance of Attorneys' Fees. Prior to the adoption of section 243 of
the Probate Code there was no Texas statute expressly providing for the
allowance of attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred by the executor in
probating or defending the will. In Salmon v. Salmon's a case of first im-
pression construing section 243 with respect to whether or not the payment
of a contingent fee is authorized, the court held that "reasonable attorney's
fees" in the statute means fees certain and not fees contingent. 4 The court
also held that the fee was a charge against the residue and should not be ap-
portioned among the parties in proportion as they gained from the litiga-
tion."'
Executors and Administrators. The use of the independent executor
without bond is quite common in Texas as contrasted with the more usual
practice in other jurisdictions of administration under court supervision.'
Cases during the year determined that the probate court does not have
authority to remove an independent executor,' even though he is accused
"Parkins v. Martin, 395 S.W.2d 862 (Texe Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.; TEx. PROB.
CODE ANN. 5 31 (1965).
13 395 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1965), 19 Sw. L.J. 866.
"4 Id. at 32. Since the evidence dealt with what a reasonable contingent fee would be for the
services, the error could not be cured by remittitur, but only by retrial. For other recent cases in-
volving attorneys' fees, see Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Kitchens v.
Culhane, 398 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.; Jacobs v. United States, 248
F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Tex. 1965) (fees and expenses must benefit estate as a whole to be deductible
for federal estate tax purposes).
1 One Raymond Salmon contended that he had not entered into a family settlement agreement
which would eliminate the probate of the will. The dissenting judges were of the view that, since
the litigation was concerned with the question of whether or not there was an agreement, no fees
should be charged to the estate but rather to the individuals as in any other contract action. 395
S.W.2d at 33. See Plummer v. Durden, 401 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (attorney's fees
not chargeable against widow who elected not to take under husband's will).
J'Tx. PROB. CoDE ANN. 5 3q (1965). Statutes in Arizona, Idaho, Puerto Rico, Texas, and
Washington provide for administration without supervision of the court. Only in Washington is
the practice generally followed. The term "independent administration" used in Texas is synony-
mous with "administration under a nonintervention will" used elsewhere. See Marschall, Independent
Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 95 (1954).
'
T Bell v. Still, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966). The case leaves open the question of whether
or not the district court has the power of removal. The court suggests the need for legislative ac-
tion in this area. Section 152 permits the closing of independent administration upon showing of
no further need therefor.
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of gross mismanagement," and that independent administration may not be
closed under section 152 by a purchaser from a distributee, but only by a
distributee.' In the case of administration under the auspices of the court
one case held that to protect the orderly administration of estates an ad-
ministrator against whom a removal action is taken should remain as
administrator while the case is on appeal."
Proving a Lost Will. When, in one case,' a holographic will dated July
1962, was admitted to probate, the testator's children filed a petition to set
aside the July will on the grounds that it was revoked by a later holographic
will dated November 1962. The November will could not be produced,
and the trial court excluded testimony of three of the testator's children,
who would have testified as to the lost will, on the grounds that such testi-
mony violated the Dead Man's Statute."
In a case of first impression in Texas, the court of civil appeals held
that evidence as to the contents of a lost instrument executed by a de-
ceased person is admissible if the testimony as to the contents is not based
on a transaction with the deceased. In the instant case the proffered testi-
mony did not relate to a transaction with the deceased,' but only to the
contents of a document as the witnesses remembered it.
The "Open Mine" Doctrine. The general Texas rule is that if at the time
mineral property vests in the life tenant, the property is not under lease,
then any bonus and royalty subsequently received must be held as corpus
with only the income therefrom accruing to the remaindermen.' Discus-
sing this point,"1 a civil appeals court approved this general rule; however,
19Cf., Ware v. Ware, 403 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). There, the county court removed
an independent executor on February 4. On February 24 the independent executor moved to set
aside the judgment. Other executors contended that the independent executor who was removed
had not given notice of appeal within ten days, had not filed an appeal bond nor designated con-
tents of a transcript on appeal. On March 23 the county court reinstated the independent executor.
On appeal, the district court held that the county court did not have authority to reinstate. The
independent executor claimed that the county court's action was void since an independent executor
could not be removed by a county court except for failure to give bond. The court of civil appeals
stated that TEx. PRoB. CODE ANN. § 222 provides otherwise, and that the removed party, by failing
to avail himself of proper remedies within the time required, could not be reinstated by a county
court. His action did not constitute a bill of review of the judgment removing him.
"Carter v. Brady, 400 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See note 18 supra.
"Bywaters v. Joyce, 399 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See Farley v. Cook, 402 S.W.2d
779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also Turcotte v. Alice Nat'l Bank, 402 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. 1966)
(appeal from injunction granted by county court should have been to court of civil appeals, not
district court).
"' Roberts v. Roberts, 405 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. For further
discussion see Ray, Evidence, this Survey at footnote 1.
aTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (1965).
"Cf., Martin v. McAdams, 87 Tex. 225, 27 S.W. 255 (1894); Walker, The Dead Man's Slat-
ule, 27 TEXAS BAR J. 315 (1964).
24 Youngman v. Shuler, 155 Tex. 437, 288 S.W.2d 495 (1956); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 151 Tex.
1, 244 S.W.2d 803 (1951).
"1Hamilton v. Clyde, 405 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error granted, 10 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 139 (1966). For further discussion see Flittie, Oil and Gas, this Survey at footnote 40.
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the result is confusing because the court held that bonuses and royalties,
which seem to have accrued from properties that were "open" at the in-
ception of the life estate, were the property of the remaindermen. The su-
preme court has granted the application for writ of error on the "open
mine" question,U and subsequent developments in the case should be
watched. This case, like so many with similar facts, suggests the need for
the greatest precision in drafting when dealing with mineral-bearing, or
potentially mineral-bearing, properties.
Payment of Debts, Claims, and Expenses. Hutchings v. Bales" is an im-
portant case in which the supreme court held that, although the common
law liability of the father to support his minor children terminates with his
death, the spouses may contract in a divorce and property settlement
agreement that the support obligation shall continue in any event until the
child reaches eighteen years of age.
Ordinarily, debts, claims, expenses, and taxes are borne out of the resi-
duary estate. Specific bequests and devises usually pass to the legatees and
devisees free and clear of charges against the residue. In a civil appeals case, 8
the testatrix in provision III of her will devised one-half of her separate
property to her uncle, and in provision IV she devised the "rest, residue and
remainder . . ." to a trust for the benefit of her husband with remainders
over to certain charities and to an individual. A provision of the will di-
rected that each beneficiary should bear the proportionate part of estate
and inheritance taxes attributable to his share and that the charities whose
bequests were not subject to tax should bear no part of the tax. The pro-
vision also directed that the husband's life interest be free of tax. The first
paragraph of the will required that all debts be paid; however, no provi-
sion was made that such debts be dischargeable out of any certain funds
or property.
The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment that the
individual beneficiaries were required to share state and federal taxes in pro-
portion to their respective shares of the estate. Debts were allocated, to-
gether with expenses, to all beneficiaries in accordance with their shares.
Although the uncle's devise was set out in provision III and the residue
was disposed of in provision IV, the court held that it was the testatrix's
intention that the uncle's devise was not to be a specific devise but was to
be part of the residue. The case suggests that provisions for payment of
claims and expenses should be given careful consideration.
In connection with drafting, counsel is well advised to consider the im-
pact of federal estate and state inheritance taxes apart from that of debts
2 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 139 (1966).
27 406 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. 1966). For furtherdiscussion see Smith, Family Law, this Survey at
footnote 69. For commentary on the civil appeals holding see 19 Sw. L.J. 666 (1965).
"Elkin v. Sanders, 397 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
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and expenses. Without the benefit of an apportionment statute, counsel's
failure to give due regard to such items may mean that the residue of the
estate, which the testator ordinarily leaves to the natural objects of his
bounty, will be required to bear a much larger proportion of such items
than the testator would have intended.
,IL. CONSTRUCTION OF CLAUSES
Generally. Ambiguities created by inconsistent clauses in a will pro-
vide a source of continuing litigation. These difficulties often arise because
testators prepare their own wills without the benefit of expert review.
Even in the absence of patent ambiguities, the language of the document
may dispose of properties in a way that was not intended by the testator.
A civil appeals case" illustrates a difficulty in the case of lapsed devises.
Section 68 of the Probate Code prevents the lapse of a devise when the
devise is to a child or other descendant who predeceases the testator. In such
case the lapsed devise passes to the descendants of the deceased devisee. The
descendants of collaterals, however, are not so protected. In the instant
case, a brother predeceased the testator; therefore, the devise lapsed. Or-
dinarily, such a devise would have fallen into the residuary estate. However,
because the residuary clause expressly excepted properties devised in other
parts of the will, the court held that the lapsed devise passed by intestacy.
Another instance of ambiguity was presented" in a case in which the tes-
tator gave his wife his estate "during her natural life to use as she sees
proper . . ." then provided that she had "full authority to sell," then pro-
vided for the division of his estate among his children if she remarried. The
court of civil appeals held that the widow's remarriage terminated her
power of sale for her children's interest. The Supreme Court of Texas has
granted application for writ of error on the issue of the limitation on the
widow's power.
To give logical meaning to a holographic will, a court of civil appeals 1
read the xestatrix's words: "In event my death predeceased her . . ." as
"In event she predeceases me," using a prior typewritten will to deter-
mine the testatrix's intent;ons. 2 One case33 applied Probate Code Section
43 to the words "revert back to my heirs" as requiring a per stirpes, rather
than a per capita distribution. With respect to the meaning of the word
2 9Neinast v. Brauckmuller, 401 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
30Satterwhite v. Commercial Bank Unincorp., 402 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
granted.
" Pruett v. Berkelev. 405 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
" There was evidence :hat the testatrix attempted to copy the typewritten will in her holo-
graphic will. hM. at 435.
"aHamilton v. Clyde, A0$ S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error granted on other issues,
10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1.9 (1966).
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"desire," a case" held that the following clause was mandatory and not
precatory. "It is my desire that each year out of the annual rent proceeds
.. they pay to my sister ... $2,400."
Charitable Bequests. A case of considerable public interest is Coffee v.
Rice University.' William Marsh Rice created a charitable trust for the
establishment of a university for white citizens with free tuition. The trus-
tees of Rice University instituted an action against the Attorney General
for a construction of the trust instrument and for an application of the
equitable doctrine of cy pres to eliminate the limitations as to white citi-
zens and free tuition. Coffee and others intervened, representing themselves
and Rice alumni who opposed the change; Bybee and others intervened,
representing themselves and other Rice alumni who favored the change.
The district court judgment allowed the change. Coffee appealed, and the
Houston Court of Civil Appeals, on its own motion, dismissed the appeal
on the grounds that Coffee did not have sufficient interest to prosecute the
appeal. By a six to three decision, the supreme court held that Coffee was
permitted to enter the case as a defendant without challenge; therefore,
he had standing to appeal. On remand to the court of civil appeals for a
hearing on the merits, the judgment for Rice was affirmed. " The benefac-
tor's main charitable purpose of maintaining a first class institution would
otherwise be thwarted by rising costs and a policy of discrimination.
In a civil appeals case a bequest for the maintenance and operation of a
named garden was juxtaposed with a bequest for the establishment of a
memorial for a deceased father. ' The former was held to be a proper char-
itable purpose and the latter a private purpose. The latter violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Because the charitable and noncharitable gifts were
intermingled, the whole gift failed.
Widow's Election. In the case of community property or separate prop-
erty of the wife, if the husband attempts to devise the wife's interest, she is
put to an election: she may claim her own property interest outright, or
she may elect to abide by the disposition in the will of her husband. Once
having made the election, she may not act inconsistently with the will by
altering the subsequent disposition of the property. There must first be a
determination that the husband did in fact intend that his will should dis-
pose of his wife's interest. In one civil appeals case " the husband's will
'Levin v. Fisch, 404 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
3'403 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
3 Coffee v. Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). "The court ...has the power
under the cy pres doctrine to order the trust funds to be applied to a charitable purpose different
from that named by the trustor, where the settlor had an intent to benefit charity generally, and
the accomplishment of the settlor's charitable purpose is impossible, impractical or inexpedient."
BOGERT, TRUSTS 376 (1963).3 7 Carr v. Jones, 403 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"SIng v. Cannon, 398 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
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spoke of "my property" and "my estate." In what seems to be an unusual
construction of the will, the court held that the husband sought to devise
the community property of his wife. Another interesting aspect of the case
is that the husband and wife were residents of Oklahoma and purchased
the land in Texas with the husband's earnings. The court recognized that
the husband's earnings in Oklahoma were his separate property, but when
such earnings were invested in Texas realty, it was held that the realty
became community property. This conclusion seems clearly erroneous in
view of the well-established principle that the separate property of the
spouses when invested in other properties during marriage may be traced
into such other properties and impart to them a separate character.
In a similar case," the court held when the husband devised "the fol-
lowing property" he meant his property interest, not the whole commun-
ity property.
In a civil appeals case' the husband and wife executed mutual wills
which for all practical purposes were identical. The language was am-
biguous; accordingly, the court read into the transaction an agreement
between the parties that once the wife had accepted the benefits of the hus-
band's will, she was bound by the terms thereof and was estopped to claim
any other interest in certain community property than a life estate. The
case is significant because it represents the first time that a Texas court has
found an implied contract in the case of mutual wills as opposed to joint
and mutual wills. The supreme court has granted an application for writ
of error in this case, and further developments should be watched.
IV. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
When a testator disposes of property in his will to those not usually con-,
sidered the natural objects of his bounty, two questions may arise: whether
or not the testator was of sound mind; whether or not the testator acted
under undue influence. Two important cases have been decided by the
Supreme Court of Texas relative to these two matters.
In Carr v. Radkey,4 ' a case involving a testator's mental capacity to make
and publish a will, the supreme court set forth a broad evidentiary rule
that testimony dealing with the testator's general mental capacity, as dis-
"Buschman v. Bryant, 400 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
' Haile v. Holtzclaw, 400 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
41 393 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1965), 20 Sw. L.J. 662 (1966). For further discussion see Ray, Evi-
dence, this Survey at footnote 12. Carr v. Radkey also overruled Pickering v. Harris, 23 S.W.2d
316 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930) which set out a strict limitation on admission of evidence. See
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 403 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (testator was 94 years old; jury
found testamentary capacity); Its re Estate of Price, 401 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
ref. n.r.e. (capacity upheld); Douthitt v. Haynie, 398 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
ref. n.r.e. (capacity upheld); Hamlin v. Bryant, 399 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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tinguished from testimony calling for legal definitions or conclusions,
should be admissible.
In Pearce v. Cross" the court pointed out the two elements of undue in-
fluence: the external, that is, the words or acts that bring the pressure to
bear; and the internal, that is, the collapse of the will of the testator. The
declarations of the testator are no evidence of the external but may be of
the internal. In the instant case the question was whether or not there was
sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the external factor.
Cross and his wife lived with Mrs. Ferguson, treating her with solicitude.
Mrs. Ferguson wanted Cross to have a cash bequest and a life estate and so
ordered in her will. Mrs. Pearce, a sister of Mrs. Ferguson, sought to have
Cross excluded from Mrs. Ferguson's bounty. She caused a second will to
be drawn and had Mrs. Ferguson execute it. There was evidence that Mrs.
Ferguson regretted the action almost immediately.
The majority found sufficient circumstantial evidence of undue influence.
The dissenters saw the evidence otherwise. They pointed out that when Mrs.
Ferguson executed the second will the lawyer, witnesses, and notary were
present, that Mrs. Pearce did not unduly influence Mrs. Ferguson's execu-
tion, and that Mrs. Ferguson's act was her own. Thus, concluded the dis-
senters, the evidence fell short of the necessary force to show undue influ-
ence. The dissenters' point is well made. The fact that the testator under-
stands the will, signs it freely, and so states to the witnesses and notary (if
the will is self-proved), is usually sufficient to establish that the testator is
not under any duress or influence.
V. DIVISION OF COMMUNITY
Although no consent of the wife is necessary for the husband's effective
transfer or assignment of community property, excessive donations of com-
munity to third persons may constitute a fraud on the wife. A civil appeals
case4' held that the element of actual intent to defraud may not have to be
proved; the fact of excessive or capricious gifts will be prima facie evidence
of fraudulent intent.
VI. ESTATE AND GrFT TAX CONSEQUENCES
Oftentimes the parties to wills and trusts will achieve their desires for
effective management and disposition of properties and yet overlook the
possibility of making relatively slight changes in language which may
substantially alter the tax consequences.
42400 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted. See Furr v. Purr, 403 S.W.2d 866
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (undue influence shown); Douthitt v. Haynie, 398 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (no undue influence); Hamlin v. Bryant, 399 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
'Hartman v. Crain, 398 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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In a federal case," the decedent, Stephen, was the beneficiary of three
trusts. Trust number one had a clause to the effect that if Stephen died
before he attained thirty years of age, the trust would continue for his
children. Trusts numbers two and three each had a clause to the effect that
if Stephen died before final distribution of the trust, the trusts would con-
tinue for his children. Stephen attained thirty years of age in 1954 and died
in 1956. No one of. the trusts had been distributed to him. Stephen's widow
demanded the funds of all three trusts, but only trust number one was de-
livered to her. In a non-collusive state action it was determined that Stephen
had a defeasible interest in trusts numbers two and three. As against the
contention of the government that trusts numbers two and three were
includable in Stephen's taxable gross estate, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the trusts were not so includable, sustaining thereby
the construction given to Stephen's interests in the trusts by the Texas
courts.
A state civil appeals case" involved a construction of newly enacted
amendments to the inheritance tax provisions. The decedent died in 1962
and left his residuary estate to a tax exempt foundation in Virginia. For-
mer article 14.06 of the inheritance tax provisions," in effect at the date of
decedent's death, did not exempt bequests of the kind here under consider-
ation. However, article 14.07 states that article 14.06 applies with respect
to a decedent dying "before the effective date of this Act if the tax im-
posed by article 14.06, as heretofore amended, has not been paid prior to
the effective date of this Act, . . ." In 1963 article 14.06 was amended to
exempt from the imposition of inheritance taxes property passing to an or-
ganization in another jurisdiction which grants a reciprocal exemption.
The estate contended that article 14.07 as applied to amended article 14.06
permitted the estate to claim the exemption since the tax had not been paid.
The court, however, held that article 14.07 applied to article 14.06 as
originally written but not as amended.
VII. BONDS AND SAVINGS ACCOUNTS IN JOINT AND SuRvIvoR NAMES
Williams v. McKnight,"' is one of a series of important cases dealing with
transactions in which Texas marital partners by a written signed agree-
ment sought to convert community funds into a joint tenancy. The court
"United States v. Farish, 360 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1966).4
"Calvert v. Beazley, 403 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. For another case
on charitable exemption from tax, see Young v. Phinney, 255 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Tex. 1966)
(provision that charitable bequest should be paid no later than five years did not mean that valua-
tion of bequest for federal estate tax purposes should be discounted as if bequest would be paid in
fivejears.)
TEx. TAx-GEN. ANN. (1963).
47402 S.W.2d $05 (Tex. 1966), 19 Sw. L.J. 835 (1965), 20 Sw. L.J. 221 (1966). For further
discussion see McKnight, Matrimonial Property, this. Survey at footnote 22.
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of civil appeals held that since the constitution provides for partition of
community under such requirements as the legislature may enact, and
since section 46 of the Probate Code enumerates a method for effecting a-
partition and a holding in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, the
latter section was constitutional." The supreme court reversed, stating that
statutory partition of the community estate resulting in separate property
is a necessary prerequisite to a written agreement under section 46 of the
Probate Code. To the extent that section 46 authorizes the creation of a
joint estate with right of survivorship out of community property, it is
unconstitutional.
Quilter v. Wendland4 ' is another important development on joint and
survivor accounts. There, one who applied for a joint and survivor ac-
count failed to obtain the signature of one of the joint owners. The su-
preme court held that the contract between the one opening the account
and the savings association was complete when the account was opened
and the passbook was accepted. The joint owner, therefore, could claim
the account on a third-party-beneficiary theory.
VIII. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
As adoptions become more numerous, questions of inheritance by and
through adopted children will occur more often. Moreover, the rules with
respect to adoption have become more exacting so that procedures under
which adoptions were valid at an earlier time would not be proper under
present laws. Discussing an interesting case in point," a court of civil
appeals determined that a child adopted validly in accordance with the law
in effect in 1925 was entitled to succeed through her deceased adoptive
father to the estate of his father who died in 1963.
IX. GIFTS FROM THE ESTATE OF AN INCOMPETENT
When the estate of a person of unsound mind is placed in the hands of a
guardian, the question may arise about what action the guardian can take
to effect tax economies by the use of estate planning techniques. The prob-
"Note, 19 Sw. L.J. $35 (1965).
"'403 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1966). See Note, Donee Beneficiary Contracts as Applied to Joint Sur-
vivorship Accounts, in this issue infra. For further discussion see Harding, Contracts, this Survey
at footnote 9.
" Hamilton v. Butler, 397 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e. An interesting
study of legislative intent and history is presented. The court noted that in 1951 article 46a, dealing
with adoption, was amended to provide that an adopted child would be considered the natural kin
of his adoptive parents only if the adoption procedure met requirements set out in the amended act.
The adoption procedure in the present case did not meet such requirements. However, in 1955




lem has been recently considered in a civil appeals decision," a case of first
impression in Texas. A bank was acting as guardian of the estate of a per-
son of unsound mind and made application to the probate court for au-
thorization to make a gift of $1,500,000 from the estate of the ward to the
residuary legatees under the ward's will in order to minimize estate taxes.
There was no oppostion to the application. However, it was denied by the
probate court and, on appeal, by the district court. The court of civil
appeals affirmed the judgment of the two lower courts on this issue.
A witness had testified that, if the gifts were made from the ward's
estate, the savings in estate taxes and the corresponding increase in the
value of the estate for the benefit of the ward's grandchildren, who were
the natural objects of her bounty and the residuary legatees in her will,
would be not less than about $240,000 and could be almost double that
amount if the gift were not one "in contemplation of death." The guard-
ian contended that, under section 230(b) of the Probate Code, it should
manage the estate as a prudent man would manage his own property and
that a prudent man would make the gift in this instance. The court held,
however, that section 230(b) had to be read in connection with other
sections of the Probate Code, particularly section 398 relating to contribu-
tions from the ward's estate for charitable purposes and section 421 relat-
ing to payments for the support of the ward's family. Since these sections
are restrictive provisions concerning the guardian's right to deplete the
ward's estate, the court held that there could be no broad general power to
dispose of the ward's property.
To do what the guardian proposed to do in this case, irrespective of the
merits of the proposal, would require corrective legislation. The case is im-
portant, therefore, to those representing estates of incompetents since it
indicates that some rather commonly employed estate planning techniques
are not available to the guardian, although if the ward were competent,
he or she might reasonably be expected to have taken advantage of such
techniques.
X. CREATION OF TRUST
In a civil appeals case"2 the grantors conveyed land to a "trustee" to be
held for the benefit of named beneficiaries, subject however to a life estate
in another. The "trustee" was given only one discretionary power. There-
fore, in determining the intent of the parties, it was presumed that they
intended to convey the greatest estate possible under the given language.
Despite the designation of a "trustee," it was held that the conveyance was
that of a life estate with remainders over.
" In the Matter of Elizabeth M. Neal, 405 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
" Clark v. Wisdom, 403 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. ,.r.e.
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XI. CONCLUSION
An overview of the cases decided makes demonstrably clear how care-
fully documents must be drafted to; avoid confusion and controversy. 
A
will or trust instrument executed early in life may not take effect until a
date many years later. Thereafter, it may be in effect for an additional
substantial period of time. If the mind of the testator or settlor is to be
known long after he and those with whom he consulted are gone, one can
appreciate the precision and care in drafting that must be exercised.
